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ABSTRACT 
Most of the studies show a clear relation between the increase of Oil revenues and the 
rapid increases in the military expenditure and arms imports (Perlo-Freeman, et al, 
2011, Ali 2013). According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI, 2010), rising prices and new Oil and Gas exploitation have given 
governments windfall revenues, some of which have found their way into military 
spending. Using global data from 1988 to 2013 for 119 countries, this research aim to 
study: To what extent does the rent from natural resources affect the military 
spending? Is the countries level of development vis-à-vis military spending? This 
study will add to the literature available on the consequences of Natural resources on 
military spending and support the resources curse hypotheses that building up the 
military-industrial complex intertwined with the natural resources revenues windfall. 
In addition, it has been shown that natural resources have got negative impact on 
defense spending such as Oil and natural gas. Moreover, a variable such as Openness 
has got a crucial significant impact on military spending, while the rent from minerals 
and coal are ambiguous and has no certain impact on military spending. 
Keywords: Military Spending; Natural Resources; Openness; Global Data 
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Chapter One Introduction 
1.1Introduction: 
 
After the global financial and economic crisis in several nations the military spending 
has risen over the decade of the 2000s, reaching USD 1,631 billion in 2010, an 
increase of 53 percent compared to base year 2000(Perlo-Freeman, et al, 2011). In 
addition, the Global Military Expenditure stands at over 1.7 trillion in annual 
expenditure at current prices for 2012. Then it fell by half a percent compared to 
2011(SIPRI Military Expenditure, 2013). 
The increase in the global military expenditure was led by the US and other countries 
in region such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait are following similar trends. Their 
region currently spends 7.4% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on military, 
although the global military spending average is 3.1%.  
A combination of factors that showed the increase in military spending in the recent 
years is attributed to these factors: the foreign policy objectives and the availability of 
natural resources. Most of nations follow the policy of developing their military 
power and influence. However, they could follow the trend of using their natural 
resources revenues in order to provide income to increase military expenditure.  
The Middle East region has the highest average ratio of military spending to gross 
domestic product. This is obviously because of the high level of regional tension. In 
addition, it is due to the global agreements between countries in order to sheer size of 
the oil and gas revenues in order to permit armed contracts such as the Al-Yamamah 
between Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and The United Kingdom (Leigh and Evans, 
2007). 
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Furthermore, many Western Europe countries and USA during the financial crisis the 
government cut backs military spending is spared. According to the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2010):  
*Some nations like China and India have enjoyed economic growth butnot 
experienced a downturn. 
* Most developed (and some larger developing) countries have boosted public 
spending to tackle the recession using large economic stimulus packages. Military 
spending, though not a large part of it, has been part of that general public expenditure 
attention and some also call this “Military Keynesianism” (SIPRI, 2010). 
*Geopolitics and strategic interests are still factors to project or maintain power: 
“rising military spending for the USA, as the only superpower, and for other major or 
intermediate powers, such as Brazil, China, Russia and India, appears to represent a 
strategic choice in their long-term quest for global and regional influence; one that 
they may be loath to go without, even in hard economic times”, (SIPRI, 2010). 
In contrast, “when it comes to smaller countries — with no such power ambitions and, 
more importantly, lacking the resources and credit-worthiness to sustain such large 
budget deficits — many have cut back their military spending in 2009, especially in 
Central and Eastern Europe” (Perlo-Freeman, Ismail and Solmirano, 2010). 
For example, “China and India, the world’s two emerging economic powers, are 
demonstrating a sustained increase in their military expenditure and contribute to the 
growth in world military spending. In absolute terms their current spending is only a 
fraction of the USA’s. Their increases are largely commensurate with their economic 
growth” (Shah, 2013; Paul dunne, 2012).  
 Furthermore, natural resources play a crucial role in driving the military spending and 
arms imports in the developing nations because, the rise of the oil prices led to more 
arms  importing. The “natural resource curse” has long been recognized as a 
phenomenon whereby nations, despite abundant rich resources, find themselves in 
conflict and tension due to the power struggles that those resources bring (Shah, 2013; 
Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999, 2001; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Collier and 
Gunning, 1999).  
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According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2010), it's 
reported that, KSA, Algeria, Azerbaijan, and Russia have been capable of increasing 
spending because of the increased oil and gas revenues. In contrast, according to 
(Perlo-Freeman, et al, 2011, Ali 2013) most of the studies show a clear relation 
between the increase of Oil revenues and the rapid increases in the military 
expenditure and arms imports. On the other hand at the Latin of America specifically 
in Chile and Peru's the increases in resources driven because their law to profits from 
the exploitation of key natural resources linked by their military spending. 
It was debated that the presence of new natural resources would be greatly increasing 
the risk of conflicts between nations, specifically if these resources include oil and gas 
(Bannon and Collier, 2003).  
Most of the cases, there's a clear relation between the increase of oil revenues and the 
rapid increases in the Military Expenditure and arms imports. According to the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2010), rising prices and new 
Oil and Gas exploitation have given governments windfall revenues, some of which 
have found their way into military spending. 
1.2 Research Question 
 
So far in we exclude (Freeman and Brauner, 2012; and Ali & Omnia, 2013) little 
empirical studies were established to relate between military spending and natural 
resources rent. Therefore, this study will follow the framework of Freeman and Ali to 
extent the data to all countries with available data and add new variables such as 
openness and utilize both of GMM model and panel dynamic model.The research 
question which's proposed in this study is: To what extent do the natural resources 
affect the military spending? Is the countries level of development represent by per 
capita income and level of growth vis-à-vis military spending? The implications of 
that would be used in order to develop new policies that can address increase in the 
military expenditure, resulted from windfall of natural resources.   
Using global data from 1988 to 2012 for 119 countries, this thesis aims to examine 
whether there are relation between the natural resources and the increase of the 
military spending.  
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1.3 Significance of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to add to the literature available on the consequences of 
Natural resources on military spending. This study tackles many reasons to believe 
that high levels of natural resources dependency could lead to high levels of military 
spending and arms imports. Furthermore, building up the military-industrial complex 
to protect the national security in order to provide basis or justifications to inefficient 
allocation of resources. (Ali, 2012). Although, the available limited research using 
empirical studies provide mix results on the relation between natural resources rent 
and military spending except oil. Thus, this study will help policy makers and other 
stakeholders to pay attention to the increasing rates of military spending at the 
expense of other needed sectors of the economy. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
 
The objectives of this study aim to investigate the effect of natural resources on 
military spending by using panel from the period 1988 to 2012 for 119 countries. It is 
important to define what is meant by conflict and identify some of the underlying 
reasons why there’s relation between the increasing percent of military spending and 
natural resources rent. Thus, the study first looks at identifying these reasons. The 
study then examines the consequences of conflict on military spending.  
1.5 outline of the Study 
 
This thesis is made up of five chapters. Chapter one will approach an introduction 
about my topic. Chapter two will review the current literature reviews on the military 
spending and natural resources. Chapter three provides the data sources and 
methodology that used in the empirical analysis of this thesis. Chapter four offers the 
model results from the used data and empirical models in this study. Finally chapter 
five provides concluding remarks and the implication of the findings from the study 
and the recommendation.   
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides the previous studies and data that show the patterns between the 
natural resources and the military spending on the global scale and regions. Moreover, 
this section offers several cases from different countries on the negative consequences 
of rising military spending.  
 
2.1 Military spending & Economic growth 
 
Many countries have high rates of military expenditure in order to sustain a credible 
deterrence. However, the increase percent of military spending is an undesirable issue 
and it's categorized as a burden on an economy because the high spending on defense 
affects the diversity of resources allocation for development projects.  
 
 According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2013), world 
military spending have crossed the figure of $1.63 trillion in 2010 that indicates a 1.3 
percent increase in real terms from 2008 military expenditure and 50 percent increase 
since 2011. Consequently, military spending is the principal component of any 
government expenditure which is used as a fiscal policy issues to raises the economic 
growth and to pursue the stated security goals.  
 
Generally, military spending is considered as public good expenditure of an economy 
but military economics analyzes the ingratiation of defense expenditure and growth of 
that economy through different routes (Ando, 2009). Many scholars as (Tahir and 
Sajid, 1999) have applied different causality tests on the real military spending and 
the gross domestic product (GDP) for LDCs.   The results of these studies showed that 
there are one way causal relation from GDP to military spending for Guatemala and 
Venezuela. In addition, there’s a one way causal relation from military spending to 
GDP in Turkey. On the other hand, there isn’t a relation between military spending 
and GDP for Sri Lanka, Ecuador, and Philippines. Therefore, this field of study still 
has a bi-directional causal relation between military spending and GDP.  
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2.1.1. Military spending cause Economic growth 
 
Several studies showed the causality between military spending and economic growth 
for several least developed countries (LDCs). Several authors have applied the 
causality test on various countries which decomposed series of the actual military 
spending and the real output. These findings carried between casual relation and bi-
directional causality between military spending and economic growth.  
 
According to Joerding, 1986 stated that military can affect economic growth through 
different routes such as "aggregate demand effect". This effect represents the 
relationship between the quantity of outputs that a country is willing to provide and 
the actual price levels and that generate a negative relation between price levels and 
aggregate demand is known as total spending. In addition, Joerding thought that if an 
economy enjoys high growth rates, it can increase military spending in order to 
protect any country from foreign aggression and to ensure the international stability 
(Joerding, 1986). 
 
Kentor& Kick (2008) made several examinations about the major capital of military 
organizations in the most world's countries whether developed or less developed 
countries. Both of them used several panels and analysis such as “cross sectional 
panel regression and causal analysis’’ of developed and less developed countries from 
period 1990 to 2003. Their findings and results showed that the actual military 
spending per solider prohibit the growth of per capita gross domestic product (GDP). 
Moreover, their findings showed that the policies of arms imports have a positive 
impact on economic growth and that found only in the less developed countries.  
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Hou (2009) took about 36 developing countries in study and he focused specifically 
on India in order to examine to what extent the military expenditure affect on the 
economic growth of a country. He used several panel data and cross sectional 
techniques in order to find the impact of military spending on economic growth. His 
conclusions showed a negative impact of military spending on the economic growth. 
In contrast, (Ali, 2012; Dunne, P., Nikolaidoua, E. and Vougas, D., 2001; Smith, R. 
and Dunne, Paul.J, 2002) their studies assumed that there's a negative impact of 
military spending on the economic growth. 
 
In addition, Lai et al (2002) examined the relation that lies between military spending 
and economic growth by using "Endogenous Growth Model" that shows the demand 
side factors. Their results and findings showed that if any economy spends more on its 
defense, it will enjoy high growth rates and that will lead to a high economic growth. 
Yildrim&Sezgin (2005) examined the linkages between military spending and 
government expenditure. They used panel data techniques for 92 countries from 
period 1987 to 1997 in order to estimate the impact of government expenditure on 
military spending. Their results showed a positive impact of government expenditure 
on military spending. 
 
Ando (2009) examined the relation that lies between military expenditure and 
economic growth in the context of Military Economics. He used Feder Model that 
discusses that an economy consists of two principal sectors "Private and public" in 
order to estimate the economic growth 109 countries with 30 Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), by using panel data during the 
period of 1995 to 2003. His results showed as military spending increases, economy 
will grow and there's no negative impact from the military spending on economy. 
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2.1.2. Economic growth cause military spending 
 
Looney (1989) assumed that the national income level of an economy could be 
showed as the most crucial indicator to illustrate the level of military spending for that 
economy. Hewitt (1996) in his studies about shifting from economic growth to 
defense spending he examined the gross national product rate (GNP) and to what 
extent its impact on military spending. His results showed that “The relationship 
might appear convex as estimated coefficient on log of gross domestic product 
appears negative and they appear positive when he use log of gross domestic product 
square” (Hewitt, 1996). 
 
Batchelor (2002) examined the military spending in South Africa countries from 
period 1963 to 1997. The results showed that the level of military expenditure is being 
estimated by national income. Tamubudzi (2007) focused on 12 Southern African 
countries during the period 1997 to 2004 in order to examine their military spending 
by using cross sectional and panel data techniques. His results assured the importance 
of GDP per capita in estimating the level of military "burden" that an economy could 
afford.  In contrast, Sun and Yu (1999) found that the military spending of china is 
positively affected to its gross national product (GNP). 
 
Moreover, Al-Yousif (2002) examined the relationship between military spending and 
economic growth by using six Gulf countries from period 1975 to 1997. According 
Al-Yousif, “A multi-variant error correction model has been used with granger 
causality test by author to get results”. The results showed that the relationship 
between military spending and economic growth cannot be simplified and should be 
seen in the context of socio-economic conditions of a country economy (Al-Yousif, 
2002). 
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2.2 The impact of natural resources on economic growth 
 
In this study, we use two variables in order to indicate the level of development are 
GDP growth and GDP per capita income in the model estimation. This debatable 
issue is to what extent there is a relationship between natural resources and economic 
growth of a country. However, most of studies assured that natural resources are a 
crucial developed factor for many countries, since 1990s some studies found that 
“resource rich countries growth has been lower in comparison to resource poor ones” 
(Saches and Warner, 1995, 1999, 2000). These findings are known as "Cursed of 
natural resources" that have been discussed in various literatures (Leite&Weidmann, 
1999; Gylfason, 2001).  
 
In the 1990s, this era was witnessing strong and negative linkages between natural 
resources exports and growth rates (Sachs, Warner, 1995, 1999). Sachs's & Warner's 
studies used a large scale data which consists of 95 countries. In addition, (Sachs, 
Warner, 1995, 1999) indicated that “after controlling for a number of factors, natural 
resources — measured by primary-product exports as a percentage of GDP — have a 
negative impact on economic growth.” In addition, several evidences showed the 
close relationship between natural resources abundance and armed conflict that has a 
negative impact on the quality of institutional system; therefore natural resources 
hamper the economic growth.  
 
In contrast, R.Auty, “In recent decades the resource-abundant developing countries 
have underperformed when compared with the resource-deficient developing 
countries. Between 1960 and 1990 the per capita incomes of the resource-poor 
countries grew at rates two to three times faster than those of the resource-abundant 
countries and the gap in the growth rates has widened significantly since the 
1970s”(Auty, 2001). 
 
Moreover, these findings had been examined by other researchers using various 
variables and econometric specifications and it has been become one of the most 
common and well known results in“the development literature” (Auty, 2001; 
Gylfason et al., 1999; Gylfason, 2001; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).   
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The debate of ‘Resource Curse’ not only raised the point of the negative impact of 
natural resources on slowing economic growth but it showed other points or 
consequences that are extremely crucial and affect the economic growth negatively. 
These consequences are: 
A. High Poverty Rates 
B. High Corruption 
C. The Authoritarian of a government    
 
2.2.1. High Poverty Rates 
 
According to the United Nations conference on trade and development, 2002, it 
examined the poverty rates and the fluctuations in poverty rates for the least 49 
developed countries. It categorized these states according to their export structure, and 
identified them into two groups which are seven countries as ‘nonfuel mineral 
exports’ and three countries as ‘oil exports’ (Ross, 2003).  
 
The results of this conference showed that, “the average poverty rate for the nonfuel 
mineral exporters was highest of all the categories of states in the most recent period 
(1997-99). The nonfuel mineral exporters also showed the greatest increase in poverty 
since the initial period 1981-83’’ (Ross, 2003). The question remains where the resources 
were spent. We strongly believe that military institutions are one of the beneficial for 
exporting the natural resources rent.  
 
Ross (2003) examined the poverty rates by using cross national measures of poverty. He 
used various measures such as direct measure which is poverty, "is the percentage of the 
population living below the national poverty line." His results showed that the natural log 
of per capita GDP has a strong impact on poverty outcomes. 
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It's important firstly to know if most of types of ‘primary commodities’ are linked 
with poverty. According to Ross, 2003, “The primary commodity dependence variable, 
however, does not tell us if all types of primary commodities are equally culpable. To 
determine what kinds of commodities are causing these effects, I divide primary 
commodity dependence into four categories – oil dependence, metals dependence, food 
dependence, and non-food agriculture dependence – and repeat the same tests”(Ross, 
2003).   The results showed a positive relation between the primary commodities and 
the poverty rates. It assured that the dependency on oil and nonfuel minerals exports 
in the late 1990s is strongly linked with poverty rates and slowing down the growth of 
many nations.  
 
Moreover, there's a clear cut that shows the primary commodities that are linked or 
generated poverty are caused by minerals, not agriculture. “In 1980, metals dependence 
was strongly linked to poverty and marginally linked to infant mortality (p=.072), while 
oil dependence was strongly tied to low life expectancy and high rates of infant mortality 
and child malnutrition’’ (Ross, 2003). 
“In 1995, metals dependence was significantly associated with low life expectancy, high 
infant mortality and poverty, while oil dependence was strongly linked with high infant 
mortality and child malnutrition, and marginally linked with poverty (p=.081)’’ (Ross, 
2003). 
Therefore, from the above evidence it showed a strong linkage between minerals and 
poverty causes. These consequences affect the growth of a country negatively and we 
could see the poverty extent to include health issues and social deprivation, and exclusion 
issues. 
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2.2.2. High Corruption 
 
Several scholars discussed how the effect of natural resources could be 
‘Heterogeneous’ and related to national institutional context (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
2004; Costantini and Monni 2008). 
 
“In countries with diffuse corruption, weak rule of law or ‘grabbing institutions’, a 
natural resource boom tends to depress growth, while in the opposite situation it 
produces positive effects’’ (Mehlum et al. 2006; Stijns 2005). 
 
In addition, several scholars linked the natural resources rents and high corruption 
rates with the quality of governance. And they assured that military spending could be 
an indicator of the quality of governance. (Steve Knack and Nick Manning, 2000). 
They assured that good governance implies accountability and transparency and the 
excessive military expenditure has a great impact for having non-accountable 
governments. They concluded that the large hidden fractions of military spending 
have a great impact on less accountable governments.  
 
2.2.3. The Authoritarian of a government 
 
It has been discussed the matter of natural resources conflicts which are based on 
"grievance", which means the deprivation of a population that doesn't earn any 
benefits from the "exploitation of natural resources" (Basedau, 2005). For example, 
Wantchekon (2002), examined a case for 141 countries during the period of 1950 to 
1990, found that "an increase of one per cent in natural resource dependence 
(measured by the ratio of primary export on GDP) increases the probability ofan 
authoritarian government by about 8 per cent" (Wantchekon, 2002). 
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According to Ross (2011) and Collier &Hoeffler (2009), there's an "inverse link" 
between oil and mineral exports and democracy because there's an effect of resources 
rents on the economic performances of democracy. Therefore, the reliance on 
petroleum natural gas and minerals will create authoritarian political regimes.   These 
findings are consistent in the Middle EastNorth Africa, where the regimescreate 
patronage system and oppression tools to subdue the citizens.  
2.3 Natural resources & armed conflict 
 
This part discusses the debate on the linkages between natural resources and armed 
conflict, debating that this conflict could raise when natural resources have specific 
natural and geographical characteristics and when a country experiences specific 
political, social and economic situations.  
 
Many scholars have reached to an agreed point to a certain extent there's a relation 
between natural resources and armed conflict after examining and investigating 
several cases. In addition, they assured that before investigating the "nexus" between 
natural resources and armed conflict, it's crucial to set the scene firstly by introducing 
the principal definitions for the concepts of armed conflicts and natural resources. 
 
According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UNDP), ‘’an armed conflict is a 
contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use 
of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, 
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year’’ (UNDP, 1946). 
Though there are different studies and data set define the conflicts irrespective of the 
definition the link between natural resources and conflict is existing.  
 
Therefore, the existence or the absence of natural resources in a country has a great 
impact on causing armed conflict. However, there are countries like Botswana and 
Norway are peaceful countries with plenty of natural resources. In contrast, there're 
countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone with 
abundance of natural resources but the experienced armed conflicts (UN, 2001). The 
availability of natural resources is not necessary to have conflict in democratically 
stable countries, however in fragile sate, it can trigger conflict.  
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Furthermore, Japan is known as a peaceful country and it relies totally on foreign 
natural resources, while Haiti isa country which is suffering from the lack of natural 
resources and in return it experienced several armed conflicts. Again deprivation 
could trigger grievance conflict; stability is achieved through development, as in case 
of Japan.  
 
These examples show different insights about each country from its culture, 
geographical position, location, and political stability. Thus the point of linking 
natural resources with armed conflict tends to be vague. These countries show that 
there's no clear inter-relation between armed conflict and natural resources in the 
global scale. 
 
Furthermore, various scholars failed to show in their studies that there is a relation 
whether the scarcity or deficiency of natural resources linked to armed conflicts. 
Galtung argued that ‘wars are often over resources’ (Galtung, 1982), in contrast Brock 
(1991) argued that “it's easy to exaggerate the importance of natural resources as an 
object of conflict.’’While (Ross, 1999; De Soysa, 2000; Le Billon, 2001) considered 
natural resources as a curse that affects the state that possesses it. 
 
It has been argued that the relation between natural resources and armed conflict 
concerns the political low dominance of government over its  natural resources can 
indeed create an armed conflict. In contrast, when a country government dominates its 
natural resources, their people will benefit from the revenues that come from these 
natural resources.Acquiring these revenues is important for several reasons: 
first,the‘non-state groups’ will not dominate natural resources and receive rent instead 
of the current residences. The second, the government can sustain its programs from 
natural resources revenues in ensuring social security and political stability. In 
addition, it's crucial to sustain social security and political stability because the lack of 
one of these issues will indicate a high degree of armed conflicts. 
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Various researchers focused on the inter-relation between natural resources and armed 
conflict did not only focus on these reasons only, but it also underlined which types of 
armed conflicts are more vulnerable to be caused in the conflict.  
 
Le Billon (2001) argued that armed conflicts differ according to the concentration and 
the geography location of the natural resources. “In his framework, when natural 
resources are point and proximate, non-state groups that want to challenge the state 
power could get the control of them only through a coup d’état and a change of 
regime, since these kind of natural resources are by definition easier to control by a 
government.’’ In contrast, "point natural resources distant from the centre of a country 
could be obtained through secession, as shown by the example of the struggle for 
phosphates in the region of Western Sahara in Morocco" (Le Billon, 2001). Finally, 
“the existence of natural resources distant from the centre of the state and diffuse can 
reinforce warlordism, as the numerous warlords who control part of the opium in 
Afghanistan demonstrate’’ (Le Billon, 2001).   
 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) showed that there is a strong relation between the 
presence of natural resources and civil wars, and they also noticed that “the higher is 
per capita income on an internationally comparable measure, the lower is the risk of 
civil war” (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998).   
 
2.4 Different types of natural resources linked to the armed conflict 
 
There has been a general agreement that oil, gas, and mining rich countries could have 
affective and sustainable policies in order to be developed and diversified by having a 
well recognition of their political and economic outcomes and reforms (Benn Eifert et 
al. 2002). On the other hand there has been a growing emphasize that ‘resources and 
ethnic fissure’, especially for low income countries, are linked with a great armed 
conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2008). 
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Several scholars tried to examine the interrelation between natural resources and 
armed conflict. There has been a strong emphasize about the cause of armed conflicts 
and other conflicts as civil wars are linked with the primary commodities specially oil 
and gas. In addition, in our study we use minerals in general to see how its rent is used 
for defense spending.  
 
2.4.1. Oil &Gas: 
 
According to Ross (2004) &McNeish (2010), there have been several quantitative 
studies that examined the role of natural resources, specifically oil and gas, on the 
armed conflict. The studies showed that the relationship between oil and armed 
conflict is "non-linear"(Collier &Hoeffler, 2004). They found that the relationship 
between armed conflict and the primary commodities exports, specifically oil and gas, 
is neither strong nor robust (Collier &Hoeffler, 2002). 
 
Their findings showed that natural resources such as oil and gas could predict wars 
not only they are considered as  primary commodities and the principal sources of 
finance but also high oil exports shows a growing indicator of dropping conflicts of a 
country by given the level of ‘per capita income’ which could increase by $5000 
(Collier &Hoeffler, 2002). Therefore, ‘’infragile state the military and institutional 
structures are not capable of effectively repressing an outbreak of armed insurrection 
as has happened, for example, in various Sub- Saharan nations’’ (Collier &Hoeffler, 
2002).   
 
Di John (2007) analyzed the linkages between oil and armed conflicts. His analysis 
showed that there's a weak correlation between the presence of oil and gas and armed 
conflicts. He argued that in oil rich countries where we could find violent or armed 
conflicts occur, oil is not the principal cause or reason, but there are other factors such 
as the weakness of a government, poor economic policies or boarders conflicts that 
plays an important role. However, Fjelde (2009) argued that political corruption is not 
the principal cause of higher armed conflicts with natural resources such as oil and 
gas, because it's associated with the stability of regime itself. Moreover, another 
conflict that could be associated with natural resources such as oil. There are three 
contrasting findings that showed how natural resources such as oil and gas are or 
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linked to civil wars and conflicts. There are ranges of possibilities: a) conflict could 
be increased by oil; b) oil has no effect; c) oil has negative relation on the conflict; d) 
oil could impact on conflict with other factors.“(DeSoysa, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 
2003). 
 
For example, one of the findings showed that the risk of civil war could be increased 
twice in oil exporting countries compared to the other countries. Furthermore, one of 
the recent studies by de Soysa and Neumayer (2007) showed that oil is linked with 
violence, ‘’but only with conflicts that have 25 casualties or less per year that is 
conflicts that are below the threshold of deaths commonly associated with civil war.’’ 
In contrast, other studies found that oil wealth not linked to conflicts and there's a 
great chance that reduces the likelihood of civil war (Smith, 2004; Humphreys, 2005; 
Di John, 2007). 
 
“While partly due to differences in methods and data, these contrasting findings also 
derive from variations in other factors that shape how oil and conflict are linked. One 
factor is time, with oil and conflict being more intertwined today than earlier’’ (Ross, 
2006; de Soysa&Neumayer, 2007). In addition, another factor which is the nature of 
the country; Humphreys (2005) found that most of the oil-producing states are less 
likely to be facing or suffering from civil war.  
 
This finding linked with a research by Basedau and Lay (2009), ‘’who assured that oil 
exporters tend to be prone to violence as a group, but countries that are more oil-rich 
in per capita terms are spared from internal violence despite being highly 
dependent’’. In other words, the states that are depending strongly on exporting oil or 
gas, but don't have a lot of it is hence, more prone to conflict than a oil-dependent 
country with relatively greater oil wealth. 
2.4.2Diamonds: 
 
Several studies in the literature on how diamonds and conflict are linked are ‘as 
inconclusive as the one on oil and conflict’. Several studies by (Humphreys, 2005; 
Lujala et al., 2005) found that countries are more likely to experience civil war that 
have diamonds than countries that don't have. In contrast, Regan and Norton (2005) 
found that diamonds are not the reasons of making armed conflicts or civil wars. 
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(Ross, 2006) in his statistical research found simply that diamonds and armed 
conflicts onset are not correlated.  
 
 
In addition, other studies that showed that diamonds connect to conflict in several 
countries. One study found that there're conflicts between diamonds and armed in 
Congo/Zaire, Russia, and South Africa (Ross, 2006). Furthermore, other countries as 
Sierra Leone, Angola, and Namibia linked with this conflict (Le Billon, 2008). 
Therefore, ‘’the number of conflicts in diamond-producing countries is so small, 
moreover, that statistical research only can give tentative conclusions about a 
diamond-conflict link’’(Ross, 2006; Le Billon, 2008). 
 
Time and the type of diamonds are linked to the diamond's impact on conflicts– ‘the 
link being stronger in our era than earlier’(Lujala et al., 2005; Ross, 2006). There are 
several types of diamonds such as ‘Kimberlitic diamonds’which are extracted from 
mines in capital-intensive processes, while‘alluvial diamonds’are collected up from 
riverbeds in more labor-intensive processes.  
 
‘’In line with a commonly held assumption, some research finds that alluvial 
diamonds are more closely tied to civil war than are kimberlitic diamonds’’ (Lujala et 
al., 2005). In contrast, other studies found that there are different conclusions "that 
alluvial diamonds are more associated with peace than with war" (Snyder &Bhavnani, 
2005), and "that alluvial diamonds are less related to civil war outbreak than are 
kimberlitic diamonds" (Ross, 2006). 
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Chapter Three:  Data and Methodology 
3.1. The Data 
 
This study tends to use panel data for 119 countries for the period 1988 to 2012. To 
answer the research question the study will tackle two types of data collection. For the 
first type in depth information will be conducted from global organizations such as 
World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Stockholm international 
peace research institute (SIPRI), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies: 
Military Balance (2005) and the Global Security website.  
This study uses descriptive data to detect the trends and levels of military spending 
and natural resources rents to support the answer of the research question. The data 
will use GDP, GDP growth, GDP per capita, natural gas rent, oil rent, coal rent, 
mineral rent, and forest rent, and most of the data are collected from the World Bank 
(2013). In addition, most of Military spending data are from SIPRI (2013), measured 
as a percentage of GDP.   
Figure 1 shows the global military spending from the period of 1988 till 2012. It 
shows the global military spending has reached over $ 1.7 trillion in its annual 
spending for 2012. However, "It fell by around half a percent compared to 2011- the 
first fall since 1998" (SIPRI, 2013). Summarizing some details the data show that 
after the increase in the global military expenditure this indicates about 0.4 percent 
decrease in the actual terms in 2011- the first fall since 1998. In addition, "This 
corresponds to 2.5 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP), or approximately 
$ 249 for each person in the world (SIPRI, 2013).  
28 
 
 
Figure 4 World Military Expenditure 1988-2012 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013, http:// milexdata.sipri.org 
 
Figure 2 shows the percentages of military expenditure according to each region. And 
as the data shows the highest spender is North America by 40%, followed by Asia 
22%, Western & Central Europe 18%, and fourthly MENA 8%. These data shows that 
the military expenditure is increasingly rapidly in countries that lack natural resources 
but on the other hand they have got the highest GDP growth and per capita that ease 
this situation.  
 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013, http:// milexdata.sipri.org 
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Figure 3 illustrates the global distribution of military expenditure in 2012. It shows 
the highest military spending specifically for 15 countries account over 81% of the 
total. As the figure shows the United States represents the highest percent of the world 
total military spending by 39.0% then followed by China which has 9.5% of world 
share, Russia with 5.2% of world share, then moving to United Kingdom 3.5%, and 
finally Japan by 3.4%. 
 
Figure 5 Global Distribution of military Expenditure in 2012 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013, http:// milexdata.sipri.org 
 
 
In figure 4, it is a continued pie chart to figure 3. It shows the other 10 countries 
ranging from 3.4% to 1.0%.  starting from France its military spending is about 3.4% , 
KSA 3.2%, India's and Germany's share is 2.6%,  Italy is 1.9, South Korea 1.8%, 
Australia 1.5%, Canada 1.3%, and the lowest one is Turkey 1.0%, and the rest of the 
world is 18%.  
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Figure 6 States with the highest military expenditure in 2012 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013, http:// milexdata.sipri.org 
 
Table 1 shows the average Military spending and natural resources rents from 1988 to 
2012 for MENA Countries. As estimated at the table Oman, KSA, Kuwait, and Jordan 
represent the highest Milex spenders. In addition the patterns of GDP per Capita at the 
table are close to GDP growth percentages; higher GDP per capita is linked with high 
GDP growth except in the cases of Sudan and Syria. Moreover, the highest GDP per 
capita countries are oil producers such as Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait. Moreover, 
Morocco and Iran are the only countries coal producers although they have small 
GDP percentage. Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, and Sudan represent the highest forest 
rents ranging from 1.6 to 0.155. Morocco is the highest recipients of Mineral rents 
followed by Iran, Jordan and Tunisia. Qatar is the highest recipient of natural gas 
followed by Algeria, Bahrain, and Oman. Moreover, Oil rents are receipted by Iraq, 
Kuwait, and KSA their percentages are 77.9, 44.6, and 39.4% of GDP.   
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TABLE 1Military Spending and Natural Resources Rent for MENA countries (Averages, 1988–2012, 
as Percentage of GDP) 
Country 
Military 
expenditure 
%GDP 
GDP 
growth 
GDP per 
capita (in 
dollars) 
Coal (in 
dollars) 
Forest (in 
dollars) 
Mineral 
(in 
dollars) 
Natural Gas 
(in dollars) 
Oil (in 
dollars) 
Algeria 1.700 2.560 1903.710 0.000 0.155 0.081 10.934 12.667 
Bahrain 5.000 5.530 12048.180 … 0.000 0.000 7.346 19.873 
Djibouti 7.000 0.950 867.690 … 0.409 0.000 … … 
Egypt 6.500 4.560 1461.640 0.000 0.277 0.112 3.847 8.252 
Iran  2.000 4.420 1604.600 0.022 0.056 0.406 5.753 25.868 
Iraq … 5.540 802.950 … 0.019 0.000 1.001 77.854 
Jordan 9.400 4.330 1945.370 … 0.030 0.495 0.221 0.003 
Kuwait 8.200 6.460 22128.670 … 0.000 0.000 2.308 41.593 
Lebanon 1.200 4.810 4830.490 … 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Libya … 4.320 6924.940 … 0.039 0.000 2.681 36.966 
Morocco 4.100 4.010 1391.700 0.003 0.213 1.047 0.012 0.005 
Oman 18.300 4.890 8810.090 … 0.000 0.050 5.923 34.084 
Qatar … 13.100 31936.120 … … 0.000 12.436 25.928 
KSA 15.200 3.510 9248.990 … 0.000 0.007 2.753 39.475 
Sudan 3.600 5.630 377.580 … 1.663 0.030 0.000 8.386 
Syria 7.300 4.910 1232.310 … 0.018 0.084 2.242 20.721 
Tunisia 2.300 4.160 2271.480 … 0.185 0.356 0.758 3.376 
UAE … 5.140 31648.550 … …. 0.000 3.507 18.154 
Yemen … 4.240 532.670 …  0.037 0.000 0.156 28.899 
 
 
Table 2 shows the average Military spending and natural resources rents from 1988 to 
2012of South Asian Countries. As estimated at the table Pakistan & Sri Lanka 
represent the highest Milex spenders although they have got low GDP Growth. In 
addition the patterns of GDP per Capita showed that Sri Lanka has got the highest 
GDP per capita and followed by India. In this table the highest Milex is not linked 
with the highest percent of GDP growth such as Afghanistan it has got the highest 
GDP growth 8.9% but its Milex is just 2.5%. Moreover, coal rents are dominated by 
India only by 1.6%. Forest rents is launched by Pakistan 4.7% and followed by 
Afghanistan by 2.9%. Mineral was leaded only by India and Oil rents as well; But 
natural gas recipient by India and Pakistan.   
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TABLE 2 Military Spending and Natural Resources Rent of South Asian Countries (Averages, 
1988–2012, as Percentage of GDP) 
 
 
Table 3 shows the average Military spending and natural resources rents from 1988 to 
2012of East Asia and pacific Countries. As estimated at the table Korea, Singapore, 
and Vietnam represent the highest Milex spenders. In addition the patterns of GDP 
per Capita at the table are far away to GDP growth percentages; higher GDP per 
capita is not linked with high GDP growth such as in China and Cambodia which they 
have the largest GDP growth but low GDP per capita and low Milex. Moreover, 
Mongolia, China, and Vietnam are the only countries coal producers and they have 
the highest GDP growth percentage. Cambodia and Vietnam represent the highest 
forest rents ranging from 4.0 to 2.8. Magnolia is the highest recipients of Mineral 
rents followed by Australia and Indonesia. Malaysia is the highest recipient of natural 
gas followed by Indonesia and Thailand. Moreover, Oil rents are receipted by 
Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia their percentages are 6.4, 6.2, and 4.6 % of GDP.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
Military 
expenditure 
%GDP 
GDP 
growth 
GDP per 
capita 
(in 
dollars) 
Coal (in 
dollars) 
Forest 
(in 
dollars) 
Mineral 
(in 
dollars) 
Natural 
Gas (in 
dollars) 
Oil (in 
dollars) 
Afghanistan 2.5 8.9 329.9 0.0 2.9 0.0 … … 
Bangladesh 1.3 5.1 395.1 0.1 1.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 
India 2.8 6.4 643.4 1.6 1.2 0.7 0.4 1.1 
Nepal 1.3 4.5 306.9 0.0 4.7 0.0 … … 
Pakistan 4.9 4.5 611.2 0.1 0.8 0.0 2.6 0.7 
Srilanka 3.5 5.1 1120.8 …. 1.0 0.0 … …. 
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TABLE 3 Military spending and Natural Resources Rent of East Asia and pacific Countries (Averages, 1988–
2012, as Percentage of GDP) 
Country 
Military 
expenditure 
%GDP 
GDP 
growth 
GDP per 
capita (in 
dollars) 
Coal (in 
dollars) 
Forest 
(in 
dollars) 
Mineral 
(in 
dollars) 
Natural 
Gas (in 
dollars) 
Oil (in 
dollars) 
Australia 2.0 3.3 28496.0 0.4 0.2 2.5 0.7 0.9 
Cambodia 2.0 7.7 473.0 …. 4.0 0.0 …. …. 
china 2.1 9.9 1616.8 2.4 1.1 0.8 0.2 2.4 
Indonesia 0.8 5.3 1296.0 1.0 2.1 1.3 2.4 4.6 
Japan 0.9 1.7 34514.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Korea, rep. 3.0 5.7 12566.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Malaysia 2.2 6.3 4879.1 0.0 2.1 0.1 4.1 6.2 
magnolia 2.3 4.1 1187.6 4.5 1.2 11.2 …. 0.9 
New 
Zealand 
1.3 2.3 20165.5 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.5 
Philippines 1.7 4.1 1214.6 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.0 
Singapore 4.3 6.9 25373.2 …. 0.0 0.0 …. …. 
Thailand 1.9 5.5 2653.5 0.1 0.4 0.1 1.2 0.9 
Vietnam 3.3 7.0 560.4 1.1 2.8 0.2 0.8 6.4 
 
 
Table 4 shows the average Military spending and natural resources rents from 1988 to 
2012 of Europe and Central Asia Countries. As estimated at the table Armenia, 
Turkey, Greece, and UK represent the highest Milex spenders. In addition the patterns 
of GDP per Capita at the table are not close to GDP growth percentages. Moreover, 
the highest GDP per capita countries are headed by Switzerland then followed by 
Denmark and Austria. Moreover, Kazakhstan is the only country coal producers 
although it has small GDP percentage. Finland represents the highest and the only 
forest rents recipient. Bulgaria and Kazakhstan are the highest recipients of Mineral 
rents. Kazakhstan is the highest recipient of natural gas followed by Romania and 
Netherland. Moreover, Oil rents are dominated by Kazakhstan by 22.1 of GDP.   
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TABLE 4 Military Spending and Natural Resources Rent of Europe and Central Asia 
Countries (Averages, 1988–2012, as Percentage of GDP) 
  Country 
Military 
expenditure 
%GDP 
GDP 
growth 
GDP per 
capita (in 
dollars) 
Coal (in 
dollars) 
Forest 
(in 
dollars) 
Mineral 
(in 
dollars) 
Natural 
Gas (in 
dollars) 
Oil (in 
dollars) 
Armenia 3.3 3.2 1425.3 …. 0.0 0.8 …. …. 
Austria 1.0 2.3 31019.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Belgium 1.5 2.0 29351.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 …. 
Bulgaria 2.6 1.5 3118.1 0.3 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.0 
Denmark 1.6 1.4 38229.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.2 
Finland 1.5 2.2 30754.7 …. 1.0 0.1 …. ….. 
France 2.8 1.8 28102.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Germany 1.6 1.8 29339.8 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Greece 3.2 1.4 15881.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Hungary 1.8 1.0 7165.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.4 
Ireland 0.8 2.5 30558.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 …. 
Italy 1.9 1.2 24702.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Kazakhstan 1.0 2.8 3791.7 5.5 0.0 1.7 3.6 22.1 
Nether land 1.8 2.3 30917.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.1 
Poland 2.0 3.8 6012.5 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0 
Portugal 2.1 2.2 13862.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 …. …. 
Romania 2.6 0.7 3501.8 0.1 0.6 0.1 2.6 1.9 
Spain 1.3 2.6 19574.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sweden 1.9 2.2 34686.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 …. 0.0 
Switzerland 1.2 1.7 46876.3 …. 0.0 0.0 0.0 …. 
Turkey 3.3 4.2 5104.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 
United 
Kingdom 
2.9 2.2 27337.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 
 
 
Table 5 shows the average Military spending and natural resources rents from 1988 to 
2012 of Latin America Countries. As estimated at the table Cuba, Colombia, and 
Chile represent the highest Military spenders. In addition the patterns of GDP per 
Capita at the table are close to GDP growth percentages; higher GDP per capita is 
linked with high GDP growth such as in the cases of Chile. Moreover, the highest 
GDP per capita countries are Mineral recipients such as Chile, Argentina, and Peru. 
Moreover, Colombia is the only country coal producers.  
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Honduras and Guatemala represent the highest forest rents ranging from 2.9 to 1.4%. 
Chile is the highest recipient of Mineral rents followed by Peru, and Jamaica. 
Argentina is the highest recipient of natural gas followed. Moreover, Oil rents are 
receipted by Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina their percentages are 5.4, 5.1, and 
3.0% of GDP.  In addition, Brazil military spending in the recent years has witnessed 
a 2% increase as a percentage of GDP from its natural resources pans. According to 
CelsoAmorim, Defense Minister, “Brazil’s growing need to protect its borders, the 
Amazon rainforest, and massive offshore oil discoveries would lead it to gradually 
increase defense spending by a quarter to reach roughly 2% of the country’s GDP.” 
In addition, he added that “Brazil has good relations with all ten of its South 
American neighbors, and hasn't been to war with any of them since the 19th century, 
so defense spending has historically been seen as a second-tier priority.” 
 
TABLE 5 Military Spending and Natural Resources Rent of Latin America Countries (Averages, 
1988–2012, as Percentage of GDP) 
  Country 
Military 
expenditure 
%GDP 
GDP 
growth 
GDP per 
capita (in 
dollars) 
Coal (in 
dollars) 
Forest 
(in 
dollars) 
Mineral 
(in 
dollars) 
Natural 
Gas (in 
dollars) 
Oil (in 
dollars) 
Argentina 1.1 2.8 6537.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.8 3.0 
Brazil 1.9 2.6 5043.1 0.0 0.7 1.1 0.0 1.5 
Chile 2.6 5.4 6275.3 0.0 0.8 10.3 0.2 0.1 
Colombia 3.1 3.7 3064.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 5.1 
Costa Rica …. 4.8 4351.6 …. 0.7 0.0 ….. …. 
Cuba 4.2 1.6 2990.4 …. 0.1 0.7 0.1 1.0 
Guatemala 0.8 3.7 1824.5 …. 1.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Honduras 0.8 3.7 1190.4 …. 2.9 0.6 …. …. 
Jamaica 0.6 1.8 3290.4 …. 0.2 3.0 …. …. 
Mexico 0.5 2.8 5660.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.6 5.4 
panama 1.3 5.0 4215.6 …. 0.2 0.1 …. …. 
Peru  1.3 3.5 2663.9 0.0 0.3 4.2 0.2 1.8 
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Table 6 shows the average Military spending and natural resources rents from 1988 to 
2012of North America Countries. As estimated at the table United States represents the 
highest Milex spender. In addition the patterns of GDP per Capita at the table are 
close to GDP growth percentages in the case of US but less likely in the case of 
Bermuda. Moreover, the highest GDP per capita is Bermuda although its non 
recipient for any natural resources rents. Moreover, no country is coal producers. 
Canada represents the only recipient for forest rents and Mineral rents by small scale. 
Canada is the highest recipient of natural gas followed by US. Moreover, Oil rents are 
receipted by Canada and US their percentages are 1.6 and 0.4% of GDP.   
 
TABLE 6 Military Spending and Natural Resources Rent of North America Countries 
(Averages, 1988–2012, as Percentage of GDP) 
  Country 
Military 
expenditure 
%GDP 
GDP 
growth 
GDP per 
capita (in 
dollars) 
Coal (in 
dollars) 
Forest 
(in 
dollars) 
Mineral 
(in 
dollars) 
Natural 
Gas (in 
dollars) 
Oil (in 
dollars) 
Bermuda ….. 1.9 54883.9 ….. …. 0.0 …. … 
Canada 1.4 2.4 28498.7 0.0 1.2 0.4 1.1 1.6 
United 
States  
4.1 2.5 34351.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 
 
Table 7 shows the average Military spending and natural resources rents from 1988 to 
2012of Sub-Sahara Africa Countries. As estimated at the table Eretria is the highest 
Milex spenders then followed by South Sudan and Angola. In addition the patterns of 
GDP per Capita at the table are close to GDP growth percentages in the case of 
Angola; higher GDP per capita is linked with high GDP growth except in the cases of 
Uganda. Moreover, South Africa and Chad are the only countries coal producers 
although they have small GDP percentage. Ethiopia and Uganda represent the highest 
forest rents ranging from 8.0 and 7.1%. South Africa is the highest recipients of 
Mineral rents. Nigeria is the highest recipient of natural gas. Moreover, Oil rents are 
receipted by Angola, Congo, and Nigeria their percentages are 65.5, 52.7, and 32.6% 
of GDP.   
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TABLE 7Military Spending and Natural Resources Rent of Sub-Sahara Africa Countries (Averages, 
1988–2012, as Percentage of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Country 
Military 
expenditure 
%GDP 
GDP 
growth 
GDP per 
capita (in 
dollars) 
Coal (in 
dollars) 
Forest 
(in 
dollars) 
Mineral 
(in 
dollars) 
Natural 
Gas (in 
dollars) 
Oil (in 
dollars) 
Angola 5.7 5.8 11682.4 …. 1.1 0.0 0.4 65.5 
Burkina Faso 1.3 5.1 335.8 …. 3.6 0.9 ….. ….. 
Cameroon 1.3 1.4 891.6 1.6 1.7 0.0 0.3 7.4 
Chad 2.5 5.5 386.8 ….. 3.8 0.0 ….. 41.9 
Congo 1.3 2.8 1464.4 ….. 2.9 0.1 0.4 52.7 
Eritrea 23.8 3.9 236.9 ….. 1.7 0.0 ….. ….. 
Ethiopia 3.4 5.6 211.2 ….. 8.0 0.1 …… ….. 
Ghana 0.5 5.5 620.9 ….. 3.3 2.0 ….. 0.1 
Kenya 1.8 3.4 490.1 ….. 2.1 0.0 ….. ….. 
Malawi 1.0 3.8 217.3 ….. 4.9 0.0 ….. ….. 
Nigeria 0.8 5.0 607.9 0.0 2.1 0.0 2.1 32.6 
Rwanda 2.9 5.0 319.1 ….. 3.4 0.0 0.0 …… 
Senegal 1.6 3.3 733.0 …. 1.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Somalia …. 0.7 162.5 …. 5.2 0.0 …. ….. 
South Africa 1.9 2.6 4301.4 2.2 0.9 1.7 0.1 0.2 
South Sudan 6.2 -11.3 1426.7 …. ….. ….. ….. ….. 
Sudan 2.7 4.7 675.7 ….. 0.0 0.0 ….. 9.6 
Tanzania 1.3 5.1 317.6 0.0 3.7 1.1 0.5 …. 
Uganda 2.5 6.7 315.1 …. 7.1 1.1 …. …. 
Zambia 2.0 3.2 609.2 0.0 2.4 9.9 …. …. 
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Military Expenditure and Natural Resources 
 
Figure 7 Oil Rents and Military Expenditure as Percentage of GDP 
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Military Expenditure and Natural Resources 
 
Figure 8 Oil Rents and Military Expenditure as Percentage of GDP 
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Figures 5 & 6 showed that military spending is following the pattern of oil rents in 
different countries around the world that have high oil rents or military spending in 
order to examine is there a relation between natural resources and military spending. 
We could see different movements between oil rents and military spending between 
countries for example in MENA countries such as Oman, Kuwait, and KSA we could 
see as the oil rent increased the military spending pattern followed the same scenario. 
While at South Asia such as Pakistan it has got the highest military spending although 
it oil pattern is the lowest one. In addition, in East Asia Singapore represents the 
highest military spending country although it has no oil rents but that contradicts with 
Vietnam case it represents the second level of the highest military spender with the 
highest oil rents. In Europe and Central Asia we could find that Turkey and Armenia 
have got the highest military spending but the lowest oil rent pattern. However, 
Kazakhstan has monopolized the oil rent by 22.1 and at the same time it was noticed 
as the lowest military spender country. Colombia and Cuba have the highest military 
spenders in Latin America but Colombia has more oil rents than Cuba. Moreover, 
Moving to Sub-Sahara Africa countries where we could find the largest oil patterns in 
Angola, Congo, and Nigeria. And at the same time they have the highest military 
spending. And there’s a direct relation between these percentages of military spending 
and oil rents.  
 
3.2. Methodology: 
 
This study assessing the impact of natural resources on military spending; using panel 
data for 119 countries for years 1988-2012, I will extent the model estimated by Ali 
and Omnia (2012) on military spending and natural resources in MENA countries to 
include more countries across different regions. 
3.2.1Dependent variable: Military Spending 
The dependent variable in the model is military spending (Milex) is measured as 
percentage of GDP, source SIPRI.  
3.2.2Independent variable: 
The independent variables in the model are oil, coal, minerals, and gas rents whereas 
they measured as percentage of GDP in order to assess their effects on the increase in 
the military spending. In addition, I'll use Openness to trade as an additional variable 
to examine its relation to military spending.  
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3.3 Variables 
 
3.3.1. Oil& Natural Gas 
 
Oil revenues in some countries provide an opportunity to spend more in military. In 
addition, the countries can engage in long term contracts with weapon producing 
countries, evidence, countries like KSA, Venezuela, and Kuwait; these countries for 
years have been engaged inbuying the military equipment and weapon acquisition for 
years. Therefore, in this model we hypothesize that the oil revenue is increasing 
military spending, this hypothesis is consistent with findings (Ali and Omnia, 2012; 
Sam, 2011). 
 
3.3.2. Minerals 
 
According to (SIPRI, 2013) "A factor that has aided the upward trend in military 
expenditure is the high and rising world market prices of minerals and fossil fuels". 
This is increase was especially in Algeria, Russia, Azerbaijan and KSA, where this 
increased from minerals and fossil fuels which have enhanced government revenues 
and promoted funds for military spending. "The enhanced in the military expenditure 
of Chile and Peru is directly from resource rentbecause their military spending is 
linked by law to profits from the exploitation of key natural resources"(SIPRI, 2013). 
In addition, China and India, the world’s two emerging economic powers,  
increasedandsustained in their military spending and sharing at the growth in world 
military spending. "In absolute terms their current spending is only a fraction of the 
USA’s. Their increases are largely commensurate with their economic growth and 
that increase in mineral rents, result in increasing military spending"(SIPRI, 2013). 
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3.3.3 Coal 
 
In the United States, an amendment to a military spending bill was presented before 
the House Armed Services Committee according to the federal law of 2007 to hinder 
the Defense Department from using alternative fuels, like synthetic oil that is made 
from coal, which produce more climate-altering pollution. A bill containing the 
Amendment passed in May 2011.  
It is important to note, that the US military's annual consumption is about 120 million 
barrels of oil, which is a grand cost to the federal government, but also a strategic risk, 
because of the volatility of world oil markets. Accordingly there are attempts by the 
Defense Department as a goal of obtaining 25 percent of its energy from renewable 
resources by the year 2025. 
An important point is the according to the US own acknowledgement that climate 
change is a national security threat. Daniel J. Weiss the director at the Center for 
American Progress called for the Congress to reject this provision suggesting the use 
of high-emission alternative fuels. 
Therefore, coal industry not onlyvital for producing energy but also could be source 
of contest among nations. Government could justifiably use the rent from coal to 
increase the military spending to protect the coal mines. One of the examples that 
could be initialized is Iran. The actual Iran’s coal resources exceed 1.5 billion tones. 
In addition, it has 130 coal active mines. Total export and extraction amount were 1.9 
million tones.  
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3.3.4. GDP growth and GDP per capita income 
 
Economic development is not only including growth but also shows the general 
improvement in welfare of the citizen. In this study we use GDP growth and GDP per 
capita as measures to the levels of economic growth. The developed countries tend to 
spend less on military spending and our hypothesis is the high development the lower 
the military spending. In fact this hypothesis remains to be tested. 
 
3.3.5 Openness to trade  
 
Openness to Trade (representing imports and exports) is an important indicator to any 
successful economy of a country. It could be measured as:  
 
       Imports + exports (both goods and services)  
=    -----------------------------------------------------------------  
                                       GDP 
This variable will be used in order to assume that the military capability of any 
country could be produced by utilizing inputs from a ‘country’s endowments’. 
Therefore, in this model we hypothesize that openness to trade has a negative impact 
on military spending, this hypothesis is consistent with findings of (Seiglie, 1988) at 
his study “Openness of the Economy, Terms of Trade and Arms” when he assured 
that openness has a great impact on military spending of country.  
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3.4. Empirical Model: 
 
The model estimates the relation between military spending and natural resources: 
Milexit= Bo + B1GDPGit_1 + B2 GDPPcapitit_ 1+ B3Coalit_1+ B4 Forestit_1 
+ B5Mineralit_1+  B6NaturalGit_1+ B7 Oilit_1+ B8Openessit+vi +Ø t + €it 
 
Where: country (i), time (t), military expenditure (Milexit), GDP annual growth rate 
(GDPG), GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$ (GDPPcapit), coal rents as percent of 
GDP (Coal), forest rents as percent of GDP (Forest), mineral rents as percent of GDP 
(Mineral), natural gas rents as percent of GDP (NaturalG), oil rents as percent of GDP 
(Oil),& openness, the country effect (ν), the time effect (Ø), and the error term (ɛ). 
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Chapter Four: Results and Discussions 
 
4.1 Results 
 
Regression in Table 8, shows that using dynamic panel vs. fixed effect model where 
the results doesn't change drastically except the natural gas variable it becomes 
insignificant in model 2 at the fixed effect model and model 3 and model 4 in 
dynamic panel. Variable for economic growth and per capita income are statistically 
significant at 5% and 1% percent respectively. However, the rent from coal is not 
significant across the models except in model 2 by 1% percent.  
For the coefficient interpretation as follows it shows that the per capita income and 
economic growth are negatively impact the military spending. For example, as GDP 
growth by 5% result in reducing military expenditure by 0.022%. In addition, the 
same scenario for Model 2, 3, and 4 we could find GDP Growth by 1% result in 
reducing military spending by 0.015%, 0.12%, and 0.011% respectively. The same 
case for GDP per capita a thousand dollar increase in GDP per capita, military 
spending decreases by 0.036 dollars in Model 1. In addition, in model 2, 3, and 4 they 
have got the same case as Model 1. Military spending decreases by 0.031, 0.015, and 
0.149 dollars. The findings of negative relation between defense spending and 
economic development is consisted with the earlier studies of (Ali, 2012; Dunne, P., 
Nikolaidoua, E. and Vougas, D., 2001; Smith, R. and Dunne, Paul.J, 2002).  
Moreover, Rent from the forest is significant at 1% level across the Models. For the 
two variables minerals and natural gas rent are ambiguous across the models. Natural 
gas is significant in model 1 while it's not significant in the other Models. In addition, 
minerals rent is significant in Model 4 while it's not significant in the other Models. 
That findings contradicts with (Ali & Omnia, 2013; Smaldone, 2006).  
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They found that the countries’ rent from forests has got a great impact on rising 
military spending, and it was highly significant across their proposed models. “For 
example, 1% increase in forest earnings increases military spending in the range of 
2.5 to 3.2%.” 
 
\The rent from oil is statistically significant at 10% in Model 1 and Model 3 and by 
5% in Model 4. However, when we introduced openness the oil rent became 
significant in Model 2 but remain significant in the other models. Our only 
interpretation is that the openness to trade means, the country economy will be 
transformed and oil as input in the production process that might affect the results. 
Moreover, in dynamic model the oil rent remains significant.    
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Table 8: Fixed effect model & Dynamic Panel Dependent Variable is Military Expenditure  
 
Dynamic Panel Model  Fixed Effect Model  
 
Variables 
 
Model 4 Model 3 Model 2 Model 1 
0.6922533 
(24.91)*** 
0.7062078 
(26.95)*** 
------------ ------------ 
 
Milex_GDPit-1 
-0.0111828 
(-2.48)*** 
-0.0128559 
(-2.88)*** 
-0.0150594 
(-2.21)*** 
-0.0224652 
(-2.80)** 
 
GDPG 
 
-0.000149 
(-2.89)*** 
-0.000015 
(-2.91)*** 
-0.0000319 
(-8.05)*** 
-0.0000364 
(-7.79)*** 
 
 
GDPC 
 
0.0255699 
(0.63) 
0.0202895 
(0.50) 
0.132884 
(2.44)*** 
0.0850237 
(1.32) 
 
 
Coal_R 
 
0.2299554 
(3.00)*** 
0.2304491 
(2.98)*** 
0.3382436 
(7.04)*** 
0.3681014 
(6.66)*** 
 
 
For_R 
 
0.0470098 
(1.83)* 
0.0288884 
(1.15) 
0.0240797 
(1.08) 
0.0202372 
(0.77) 
 
 
Min_R 
 
-0.0125688 
(-0.87) 
-0.0185616 
(-1.30) 
0.0264199 
(1.22) 
-0.0398323 
(-1.56)* 
 
 
NG_R 
 
0.176026 
(1.99)** 
0.0146689 
(1.70)* 
0.0161767 
(1.39) 
0.0224407 
(1.67)* 
 
 
Oil_R 
 
-0.0052903 
(-2.06)** 
------------ 
 
-0.0118195 
(-5.56)*** 
------------ Openness  
-0.9740374 
(5.75)*** 
0.7040775 
(6.58)*** 
3.120132 
(26.16)*** 
2.6657 
(31.00)*** 
 
Constant 
 
1610.93 
 
81.24 
27.38 
 
19.57 
 
F 
 
------------ ------------- 0.1880 
 
0.1256 
 
R2 
 
899 902 1004 
 
1011 
 
N 
Notes: 
***Statistical significance at 1% significance level 
**Statistical significance at 5% significance level 
*Statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 9, shows the panel regression data GMM; dependent variable Military 
spending. The coefficients estimates for Military spending as a percentage of GDP, 
GDP growth, GDP per capita income, Coal rents, Forest rents , Minerals rents, 
Natural Gas rents, and Oil rents. Variables for economic growth and per capita 
income are statistically significant at 1% and 5% respectively in Model 1 and at the 
Models 2 they are significant by 1% and 10% respectively. However, the rent from 
coal is not significant in Model 1 but significant by 10% in Model 2.  The same case 
in the rent from Forest which is insignificant in Model 1 and significant in Model 2 by 
5%. In the case of Mineral rent is insignificant in both Models. 
Moreover, rent from natural gas is significant in both models by 10% and 5% 
respectively. The rent from oil is statistically significant at 10% in both Models. 
However, the only rent from the natural gas and oil are statistically significant, the 
rent from the forest is ambiguous. That findings contrast to certain studies, the oil and 
natural rent impacts on defense spending is consistent with the findings from previous 
research (Smith, R., 2000; Ali, 2011). In addition, the Openness to trade variable has a 
negative impact on military spending for both Model 1 and 2. At model 1 and 2 it’s 
significant by 10%. 
For the coefficients interpretation as follows it shows that the per capita income and 
economic growth are negatively impact the military spending. For example as GDP 
growth by 1% result in reducing military spending by 0.012%, and the same scenario 
for the second Model we could find GDP growth by 1% result reducing military 
spending by 0.011%. The same case for GDP per capita a thousand dollar income in 
GDP per capita, military spending decreases by 0.0164 Dollars in Model 1, and in 
Model 2 military spending decreased by 0.0192 Dollars.  In addition, rents from 
Natural Gas have the same impact as GDP per capita and GDP growth. It affects the 
military spending negatively by reducing it by 0.013%, 0.016% in Model 1& 2 
respectively.   
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Table 9: Panel Data GMM; Dependent Variable Military Spending  
 
Model 2 Model 1 Variables 
0.732001 
(17.47)*** 
0.761329 
(41.67)*** 
 
 
∆Milex_GDPit-2 
 
-0.011859 
(-2.50)*** 
-0.012259 
(-2.46)*** 
 
∆GDPGit-1 
 
0.0192 
(-1.79)* 
-0.0164 
(-1.86)** 
 
 
∆GDPC it-1 
 
0.036485 
(1.30) 
0.030984 
(1.14) 
 
 
∆Coal_R it-1 
 
0.180737 
(2.00)** 
0.134552 
(1.14) 
 
 
∆For_R it-1 
 
0.054547 
(1.28) 
0.044865 
(1.27) 
 
 
∆Min_R it-1 
 
-0.016237 
(-1.92)** 
-0.013506 
(-1.60)* 
 
 
∆NG_R it-1 
 
0.009931 
(1.70)* 
0.010446 
(1.81)* 
 
 
∆Oil_R it-1 
 
-0.005859 
(-1.38)*** 
-0.004476 
(-1.24)*** 
 
Openness 
 
---------------- 
 
 
---------------- 
 
F 
 
912 
 
 
916 
 
N 
 
Notes: 
***Statistical significance at 1% significance level 
**Statistical significance at 5% significance level 
*Statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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4.2 Discussion 
 
Overall the results from Table 8 and 9 showed that the presence relation between 
military spending and natural resources. In Table 8, it's obvious to show that effect 
from its variables such as Gross Domestic Product Growth (GDPG) and Gross 
Domestic Product per capita (GDPC) which they are significant variables and they 
affect military spending negatively and that contradicts with the previous studies that I 
mentioned at the literature review such as (Hou,2009; Ali, 2012; Dunne, P., 
Nikolaidoua, E. and Vougas, D., 2001; Smith, R. and Dunne, Paul.J, 2002).Those 
studies assumed that there's a negative impact of military spending on the economic 
growth. 
In addition, that contradicts also with (Kentor& Kick, 2008) when they assumed that 
military spending prohibit the growth of per capita GDP. (Ando, 2009) examined also 
this relation and his results showed that when an economy increases the military 
spending increase and there’s no negative relation between military spending and 
economic. Moreover, going back to my results at Table 8 that it's similar to 
(Tambudzai, 2007) When he assured the importance of GDP per capita in estimating 
the level of military "Burden" that a country could afford.  Tambudzai’s study is 
linked to (Lai et al, 2002) when their results showed that if a country spends more on 
its defense, it will enjoy high growth rates and that will lead to economic growth.  
Furthermore, the previous studies showed the interrelation between natural resources 
and military spending and these studies showed there is a linkage with  the primary 
commodities especially Oil. These findings are linked to my findings at Table 8where 
Oil Rents represent the most significant natural resource that has got positive relation 
to military spending.  
In addition, Openness Variable has a crucial impact on military spending. At Table 8 
and 9, openness is a crucial and significant variable that affects military spending 
negatively because as we know most of the countries prefer to imports armed 
weapons and that give a high chance of spending more.  
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In Table 9, it has got the same scenario as Table 8. The results showed that GDPG, 
GDPC, while oil has positive impact on military spending. In addition, the variable of 
natural gas in model 9 and 10 shows that is significant at 10% & 5% respectively and 
it affects military spending negatively.  
This mean that GDPG, GDPC, Openness, and natural resources such as Oil Rents and 
Natural Gas have got a significant effect on military spending, while other factors are 
not. This means that those factors that have got a significant effect are crucial to 
control the military spending of a country.  
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Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
The objective of this thesis was to what extent do the natural resources affect the 
military spending? Is the countries level of development whether low, middle, or high 
income levels vis-à-vis military spending and natural resources matters? The 
implications of that would be used in order to develop new policies that can address 
that increase in the military expenditure, resulted for windfall of natural resources.   
To answer this question I used global data on GDPG, GDPC, Natural resources Rents, 
and openness, and levels of Income, that were collected for 119 countries for a period 
of 24 years, from 1988 to 2012. The empirical results in this study have shown that 
there is in fact a differential impact of the different types of Natural resources and 
economicdevelopment variables on the military spending rates. More specifically the 
study found that military spending was impacted negatively by the development 
variables. Furthermore, the presence of Oil Rents had a significant impact as shown in 
Table 9 & 10, than did Natural Gas. 
This paper’s shortcoming with regards to the availability of data suggests areas of 
future research which could be used in order to develop new policies that can address 
that increase in the military expenditure, resulted for windfall of natural resources.   
Thisthesis aims to give a potential intervention to reduce the military spending burden 
by reviewing their policies and getting the most use of their natural resources that 
have negative impact on their defense spending such as Oil and natural gas. 
Moreover, a variable such as Openness has got a crucial significant impact on military 
spending as I introduced at Table 8 and 9.  
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5.2. Recommendations 
 
Governments expend from 3% to 8% of their gross domestic product (GDP) and 5% 
to 30% of central government expenditure (CGE) and 11% from the global rates on 
defense sector.  In addition, the international monetary fund (IMF) found that 
countries with high levels of military spending (% of GDP) is associated positively 
with high levels of corruption, poverty and authoritarian government.(Gupta, Sanjeev 
et al., 2000). 
In the recent years, many governments of Netherlands, Canada, and UK have 
published their overall military spending levels.  This policy is very important to be 
followed by other nations in order to reduce the concept of authoritarianism, levels of 
corruption, and poverty rates. 
More focus on development and pay attention on gross domestic product growth 
(GDPG) and gross domestic product per capita income (GDPC).  Because these 
variables have got a great impact on military spending. 
Follow the policy of how to allocate recourse effectively and take to our consideration 
the concept of ‘Resource Curse’ because some minerals have got a great impact on 
military spending such as oil and natural gas. In addition, they have got an impact on 
social development and welfare.  
In addition, focus more on openness. This variable has got a great impact on military 
spending because it represents the rates of imports and exports. In contrast, this 
variable will disclosure the transparency and accountability of the trading transactions 
between nations. 
Finally, discuss the policy of reducing oil prices. By reducing oil prices that will 
reduce a country’s economy because of the reduction oil demand and will limit the 
ability to increase their military spending and reduce the threats to their neighbors.  
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